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Since Basil Moore published Horizontalists and Verticalists in 1988, there have been numerous 
attempts to model an endogenous money supply within a graphical framework which would also 
facilitate discussion of some of the controversial issues surrounding it.  These have not generally 
been very successful until Fontana’s recent (2003, 2006) adoption of a pure flow of funds 
framework. 
  More recently, the ‘New Keynesian consensus’ in macroeconomics has finally forced a 
rejection of  the exogenous money paradigm and the LM part of the familiar IS/LM/AS model. In 
this paper we show how, with some modification, Fontana’s approach can be combined with 
‘mainstream’ replacements of IS/LM (Carlin and Soskice, 2006; Bofinger, Mayer and 
Wollmerhäuser, 2006) to produce a model of the monetary sector which illustrates both the current 
wisdom about monetary policy (e.g. Woodford, 2003) and the post-Keynesian insights that have 
been developed over the last twenty years. 
 
   2
1.  Introduction 
 
Economists of a post Keynesian persuasion and with an interest in money could be forgiven a 
wry smile over recent developments. With Woodford’s (2003) Interest and Prices we have what 
the author calls the ‘foundations of a theory of monetary policy’ in which the money supply is 
endogenously determined and the short-run interest rate is the policy instrument. And Woodford 
is not alone. Just a few years earlier publications by Clarida et al. (1999), Romer (2000) and 
Walsh (2002) suggested that, at long last, economists of an ‘orthodox’ persuasion were catching 
up with what both central bank and post Keynesian economists had known for years.
1 
  But while a wry smile may be justified, premature self-congratulation is not. There is a 
distinct danger here that textbooks of the future will eventually be written that give the credit for 
this ‘breakthrough’ in monetary economics entirely to the writers named above. It would be 
galling, for most post-Keynesian economists, if, after having been right all along,
2 they found 
their work ignored by future generations of students who were brought up to believe that the truth 
was discovered only around the cusp of the millennium by something called the ‘new consensus 
macroeconomics’. This would be especially true for those who emphatically reject the long-run 
neutrality of money which is part of the ‘new consensus’. 
3  Fortunately there is still hope since 
macroeconomic textbooks which treat money in an accurate and helpful way are only just 
beginning to appear.
4   
  This paper is largely about the representation of the essentials of endogenous money and 
how those essentials can be linked to a tractable pedagogic model of the macroeconomy. In doing 
so it draws largely on the existing work of others (post Keynesian and ‘new consensus’). But it is, 
critical of some aspects of each of these contributions and, of course, is treading new ground by 
bringing them together. 
  We start, in the next section, by looking backward – at some of the difficulties and errors 
perpetrated in early attempts to link the endogeneity of money to conventional expositions of 
macroeconomics and at how these expositions came to be associated with positions in the 
structuralist/accommodationist debate which was then in progress. 
  In section 3 we examine the framework developed by Fontana (2003 and 2006) to 
represent the essentials of an endogenously-determined money supply. We shall show that 
amongst its various strengths it can even capture some of the quite subtle debates (the demand for 
endogenous money, structuralist/accommodationist) that have taken place amongst post-
Keynesian economists. 
  In section 4 we turn our attention to a recent attempt to construct an alternative to 
IS/LM/AS, in which the money supply is endogenously-determined and the policy instrument is 
the rate of interest. For reasons we explain during the discussion, we have chosen the approach of 
Carlin and Soskice. 
  In section 5, we show that some of the weaknesses of this (and related) approaches can be 
remedied by borrowing from Woodforde (2003) and Fontana (2006) and, above all, that 
combining a modified version of Fontana (2006) with Carlin-Soskice (C-S) can create a model 
                                                 
1 ‘Virtually every monetary economist believes that the CB can control the monetary base and ... the broader 
monetary aggregates as well. Almost all of those who have worked in a CB believe that this view is totally mistaken’ 
(Goodhart, 1994 p.1424). And in Woodford’s words: ‘It is true that the conceptual frameworks proposed by central 
banks to deal with their perceived need for a more systematic approach to policy were, until quite recently, largely 
developed without much guidance from the academic literature on monetary economics’ (Woodford, 2003 p.3). 
2 Or at least for the thirty years since Davidson and Weintraub (1973).  
3 For example, Arestis and Sawyer (2002, 2005); Sawyer (2002); Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2005); Romer and 
Romer (1989); Leon-Ledesma and Thirlwall (2002); McCombie et al (2002) and many others. 
4 Carlin and Soskice (2006) make a bold effort and almost succeed. On the other hand, within the last year alone I 
have received unsolicited copies of five new macroeconomic textbooks. In four of the five (Burda and Wyplosz, 
2005; DeLong and Olney, 2006; Krugman and Wells, 2006; Miles and Scott, 2005), the AD curve is derived from an 
IS/LM model wherein the authorities are assumed to fix the money supply.   3
which can be used to combine the principles of the (reformed) mainstream macroeconomics with 
the subtleties and richness of the post-Keynesian insights on money. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Early representations of endogenous money 
 
In reacting against models of the macroeconomy in which the money supply is treated as 
exogenous, it is understandable that critics should want to find a representation of endogenous 
money which confronted the orthodoxy as directly as possible. Since the orthodoxy depicted the 
money supply as a vertical curve drawn in interest-money space, the temptation to turn it through 
ninety degrees and claim that the money supply was completely elastic at the rate of interest of 
the central bank’s choosing (now represented by the intercept), was irresistible. Indeed, it lay 
behind the title of Basil Moore’s treatise published in 1988.
5 Unfortunately, however intuitively 
appealing, it was misleading. That framework was intended to show the behaviour of stock 
demand and supply, while the endogeneity of money was concerned with flows. Be that as it may, 
the idea that turning the (stock) money supply curve through ninety degrees could yield a useful 
comparison with the orthodox view caught on.
6  
  The errors encouraged by this were set out by Arestis and Howells (1996) and therefore 
need only brief mention here. The first is a logical one and goes to the very heart of the 
endogenetiy paradigm. The money supply is endogenous because the deposits that make up (the 
bulk of) the money supply are created by net new bank loans, the demand for which originates 
within the economic system. However, given that the deficit units demanding credit are somewhat 
distinguished from those (the ‘general population’) who must hold the resulting deposits, there 
must be some process whereby any ex ante divergence in these preferences is reconciled. In other 
words, what emerges ex post as endogenous money is the resultant of the demand for loans and 
the demand for money. It is not a supply curve in the conventional sense of the term. And, 
moreover, since it already incorporates a ‘demand for money’ there seems little point in drawing 
it in a framework whose very purpose is to show the interaction between independent demand 
and supply curves. A more realistic use of interest-money space would be to recognise that the 
real contrast between the endogenous/exogenous cases is that in the latter the supply curve shifts 
if and only if the central bank makes a conscious decision to shift it, while in the former a 
continual rightward shift is the norm. Furthermore, if the rate of rightward shift of the supply 
curve matches that of the demand curve, then the movements will trace out a locus which will be 
horizontal with the respect to the rate of interest – in effect a horizontal LM curve. But it need not 
be horizontal and it is not a supply curve.  
There is a further problem and this grows out of what at first sight looks like an advantage 
of our new interpretation. The apparent advantage of representing the endogeneity of money as a 
constantly shifting supply curve which, when allied to a shifting demand curve, traces out an LM 
curve which could be horizontal allows us to introduce the notion of liquidity preference. As we 
noted above, if the demand for new loans creates additional deposits at a rate which is exactly 
matched by the willingness of the community to hold additional wealth in that form, then the 
interest rate locus will be horizontal. But suppose, by contrast, we have a reduction in liquidity 
preference such that the ex ante demand for loans now creates deposits at a rate which exceeds 
the community’s willingness to hold additional wealth in money form. Then a change in relative 
interest rates occurs, the effect of which is to produce the necessary ex post equilibrium by 
                                                 
5 Moore (1988) Horizontalists and Verticalists: The macroeconomics of credit money (Cambridge: Cambridge U P) 
6 This is a major, but charitable, simplification. Those who describe the behaviour of endogenous money in interest-
money space by reference to a money supply curve include Lavoie, 1985, p.71; Kaldor, 1982, p.24, 1983 p.22; Moore, 
1988, p.263 and 1989, p.66; Rousseas, 1986, p.85 Wray, 1990, pp.166-7. Others, e.g. Palley, 1991, p.398; Dow 1993, 
1994 and Dow and Earl, 1982, p.140 refer to it as a credit or loan supply curve. Lavoie, on a later occasion (1994, p.12) 
covers all possibilities by referring to it as a ‘...credit or money supply curve...’ (our emphasis).  What all this shows is 
that the initial decision to tell the story of endogenous money supply creation within an orthodox framework led to a good 
deal of confusion.   4
simultaneously slowing the expansion of bank loans and increasing the demand for the resulting 
deposits. The details of these relative changes are in Howells (1995).  Briefly, the attempt to limit 
their holdings of the newly created deposits involves agents switching to non-money assets 
whose prices rise and yields fall. Since these non-money assets are simultaneously the liabilities 
of deficit units, the switch has reduced the cost of non-bank borrowing leading to a reduced flow 
of new loans (and deposits). At this point the locus of intersections in our supply and demand 
diagram shifts downward, resuming a horizontal trajectory as soon as the rate of deposit creation 
(rate of shift of the supply curve) is reduced to match the rate of increase in the willingness to 
hold new money. 
  So why is this advantage only apparent rather than real? The answer lies in the rate of 
interest whose path is being traced out in the locus. The rate of interest in the interest-money 
space of the orthodox money market diagram, must represent the opportunity cost of money.
7  It 
cannot be anything else, if the interest-money space is to host a downward-sloping money 
demand curve.
8 So far so good - the rate on non-money assets that we want to trace out could be 
said, with only a little simplification, to represent the opportunity cost of holding money.
9 But at 
the beginning of this section, we saw that endogenous money was often represented in interest-
money space, not just by a ninety-degree rotation of what was called a supply curve but also that 
the intercept on the vertical axis was treated as the interest rate set by the central bank.   
 
The short-term supply function of nominal credit money is horizontal in interest-money space, at a 
level based on the supply price of liquidity (reserves) administered by the central bank. Whenever the 
central bank increases or reduces its marginal lending rate to the financial system in pursuing its 
ultimate policy goals, the horizontal money supply function shifts vertically up or down. (Moore, 1988, 
p.263) 
 
Here is the problem. We cannot get away from the fact that interest-money space requires that the 
interest rate must be the opportunity cost of holding money. As we saw above, this might be 
consistent with it also being the rate on non-money assets which reconciles the demand for loans 
with the willingness to hold deposits but it cannot be the policy rate set by the central bank. And 
we cannot salvage the situation by saying that a change in the rate on the vertical axis represents 
a matching change in the policy rate by virtue of a stable mark up. The mark up literature relates 
to the rate charged on bank loans which again is far removed (as a concept) from any rate on non-
money assets. Furthermore, empirical work on the relationship between the official rate and 
market rates (on loans, deposits, bonds and whatever else, and in a range of countries) suggests 
that there are large and persistent variations in spreads in response to a change in the policy rate. 
(Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells, 2002; Cook and Hahn, 1989; Cuthbertson et al, 2000; 
Dale, 1993; Heffernan, 1997).  
  The argument of this section is that early attempts to discuss endogenous money within an 
interest-money framework inherited from orthodox economics were quite unsatisfactory, though 
one can understand the desire to confront the exogenous money fiction in the simplest and most 
direct way. We shall see in the next section that a discussion which yields genuine insights needs 
a completely different framework. Before leaving interest-money space, however, we should 
                                                 
7 This is an admittedly Tobinesque interpretation of the demand for money. But it makes no difference to our 
argument if we take a more fundamentally Keynesian position and think in terms of the downward-sloping money 
demand curve being the outcome of expectations about the future level of interest rates derived from a view about 
the current level in relation to some ‘normal’ level. The relevant rate is still the rate on non-money assets, i.e. on 
‘bonds’. 
8 Suppose we think of it as money’s own rate, for example. The demand curve would then have to be upward-
sloping. 
9 After all, most undergraduate textbooks take ‘bonds’ to be the alternative to money and bonds are certainly one 
form of non-money asset whose issue represents an alternative to bank borrowing as a source of corporate finance. A 
simplification is involved, however, since the opportunity cost of holding money should strictly be a spread term – 
the difference between the bond rate and money’s own rate. The common practice of representing it by the bond rate 
requires an assumption that money pays no interest, of course.   5
refer at least briefly to one of the major debates within the endogenous money paradigm which 
drew on the confusion (and to which we refer in the title of this paper).  
  Given that the money supply is endogenously determined, this raises the question of how 
banks deal with the need for reserves. This is the basis of the accommodationist/structuralist 
argument wherein the former argues that central banks make reserves available on demand, either 
because they have an interest target or because they are obliged to do so in order to maintain the 
stability of the banking system, while the latter argues that banks can anyway circumvent a 
shortage of reserves by virtue of innovative behaviour. Details of this distinction (and the 
protagonists) have been widely discussed and limits of space oblige us to refer readers elsewhere 
(e.g. to Fontana, 2003; Dow, 2006; Lavoie, 2006). What is of some interest here, however, is that 
the mention of liquidity preference (or a demand for monetary assets) appears to be sufficient 
qualification to enter the structuralist club. It is not immediately clear (to the present author, 
anyway) why this should be the case, except that once we introduce the issue of ‘demand’ we 
raise the possibility that the endogenous growth of the money supply might be accompanied by 
rising interest rates and this is one of the consequences that would follow from binding reserve 
constraints and, indeed, would be one of the incentives driving banks’ innovation to minimise 
such constraints. But I should stress that when I raised the question of the ‘demand for 
endogenous money’ in the debate with Basil Moore (Howells, 1995 and 1997; Moore 1997) and 
of the role of demand in representations using interest-money space (Arestis and Howells, 1996) I 
intended no contribution to the accommodationist/structuralist debate and have been surprised 
(and flattered) to be linked with such illustrious company.
10 For the record, my view on this 
particular issue is, I think, that both processes are central to endogeneity but their relative 
importance depends upon the period under review. Clearly banks do innovate and much of the 
time the incentive is provided by a desire to outwit the authorities. (See Chick and Dow (2002) 
for a discussion in connection with capital adequacy requirements). But this process takes time 
and a reserve shortage in a system which requires banks to hold daily positive balances at the 
central bank can only be met by immediate accommodation.
11 But a recognition that demand 
matters to a sensible exposition of endogenous money does not (it seems to me) commit one to a 
pro-structuralist view. Since we have said all along that simply trying to cast a representation of 
endogenous money in interest-money space is so unsatisfactory, then one might think that using 
the same space to discuss subtleties like the accommodationist/structuralist debate is asking for 
trouble. 
  We turn now to more recent, and promising, developments. 
 
 
3. Recent improvements 
 
Fontana (2006) offers the following diagram as a better alternative to capturing the key features 
of endogenous money. It is essentially the same as the diagram in Fontana (2003) and we explain 








                                                 
10 In Fontana’s (2003) survey it also includes Chick (1977, 1983), Minsky (1982), Rousseas (1986), Dow (1997), 
Palley (1996), Sawyer (1996) and Wray (1990). 
11 As used to be the case in the UK. A more relaxed system was introduced in May 2006 whereby balances have to 
be positive only averaged over the ‘maintenance period’ between monthly meetings of the MPC. Even so, the Bank 
of England endeavours to provide reserves so as to maintain the MPC rate. 
























   
  
 
Firstly, the diagram depicts flows. Hence, at the current rate of interest charged on loans, rL, net 
new loans are being created at the rate L0. This creates new deposits at the rate of D0 which 
requires reserves to expand at the rate R0. The rate of interest charged on loans is a mark up on 
the official rate r0 at which the central bank is prepared to make available whatever reserves are 
required by the banking system. By representing flows, the diagram captures the most basic and 
fundamental insight of an endogenous money regime. If the authorities sit on their hands, money 
and credit grow at their current rate. Growth is the norm. If the authorities intervene, the 
intervention changes the growth rate. By contrast, in an exogenous regime, if the authorities do 
nothing, the money supply is fixed.  
  For a second interesting feature, let us begin by looking at the lower-right quadrant, which 
expresses the ‘loans create deposits’ principle. As drawn, the LD (better understood as the L=D) 
curve passes through the origin at 45-degrees to the bank loans/ bank deposits axes. What 
Fontana does not make clear is that this line is drawn for a given opportunity cost of money – 
given in the sense of fixed, not given in the sense of unique. If we make that adjustment, then we 
can see that the diagram can be used to explicate the process that we mentioned earlier, whereby 
the ex ante demands for loans and deposits can be reconciled ex post. Suppose for illustration that 
we repeat the case we had earlier whereby a decline in liquidity preference means that the current 
flow of net new loans creates ex ante an expansion of deposits which exceeds the community’s 
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Initially, the LD line rotates anti-clockwise temporarily to LD′ as the community attempts to hold 
fewer additional deposits than the current flow being generated by the demand for credit (ex ante 
desired deposits groing at D″ against ex ante loan growth of  L0). This attempt involves 
exchanging deposits for non-money assets. In the aggregate, of course, this must fail, but prices 
will rise and yields will fall. As a result of the fall in the bond rate, non-bank finance becomes 
cheaper and in the upper-right quadrant, the demand for loans curve shifts inwards (to L
D′ ). At 
the same time, the interest rate adjustment that is causing the shift of L
D is causing the 
opportunity cost of holding money to fall producing a willingness to hold D′ (growth in) deposits 
rather than D″.  When the change in relative rates is complete, the LD curve resumes its original 
position and loans and deposits grow in step at B and at D′ (rather than A and D0). 
  By comparison, two other issues are easily dealt with. The difference between rL and r0 is 
the banks’ mark-up over the official rate. Changes in this spread, a matter of commercial 
judgement for banks, can be shown by a change in m. Other things being equal, an increase in 
banks’ risk aversion (for example) is shown by an increase in m and an  upward shift in L
S. 
Loans, deposits and the demand for reserves all grow more slowly. Given a negative interest-
elasticity in the demand for loans, the flow of new loans (and deposits) is reduced. In the 
diagonally opposite quadrant, changes in banks’ desire for liquidity can be shown by rotations in 
the DR curve. For the UK, where banks’ holdings of reserves are approximately 0.5 per cent of 
deposits, the DR line should be drawn very close indeed to the bank deposit axis. An increase in 
that ratio (perfectly possible in the UK where the reserve ratio is entirely prudential) would be 
shown by a clockwise rotation and, other things being unchanged, an increase in the growth rate 
of reserves (relative to loans and deposits). In practice, of course, one could easily imagine that 
the two events are linked. Banks, being more cautious, increase the mark up to reduce their 
lending and at the same time seek to operate with a higher degree of liquidity. In this case, the 
flow of new loans and deposits decreases and, with a clockwise rotation of the DR line, the 
existing flow rate of additional reserves serves to increase banks’ liquidity.  
We can also use the diagram to illustrate aspects of the accommodationist/structuralist 
debate.  (See Fontana, 2003, pp.301-05). So far, we have assumed that reserves are forthcoming 
in any quantity demanded by banks (shown by the DR line). But, in the structuralist view, they 















































However, while this is easily done in the figure, its interpretation requires considerable care. One 
interpretation goes as follows. Clearly, as things stand there is an excess demand for reserves. If 
the central bank holds to its restrictive (non-accommodating) position, then the supply curve of 
reserves becomes vertical (the flowis fixed). Bidding for the limited additional reserves will raise 
inter-bank rates. Assuming a fixed mark-up, this is passed on as a higher lending rate (rL′) and we 
move up the L
D curve.  The flow of loans (and new deposits) is reduced. Notice, though, that we 
are now treating the interest rate as the market price of reserves and not necessarily the rate fixed 
by the authorities. Notice, also, that this presupposes that the central bank is able to restrict the 
growth of reserves, independently of the interest rate that it charges. We are back to some sort of 
monetary base control, albeit in a dynamic setting – aimed at the growth rate of reserves rather 
than the absolute amount. This interpretation is equivalent to making the money supply 
exogenous. 
  Knowing how central banks actually work, a better interpretation is that the central bank 
increases the rate on reserves (by announcement), banks raise their lending rates (assume the 
mark-up is fixed) and the reduction in reserve growth is demand-determined. If that is the case, 
then once the change in rates has taken place, the growth rate of reserves becomes elastic again at 
the new rate of interest but the central bank has the satisfaction of knowing that whatever growth 
rate emerges, it will be slower than it would have been prior to the rise in rates.  
  In his 2003 paper Fontana depicts the supply of reserves in the top-left quadrant as a 
stepped line, ascending as we move to the left. This is his way (p.303) of representing the 
structuralist/accommodationist debate. In the horizontal sections of the ‘curve’ the central bank 
accommodates the demand for reserves, but the fact that it is less than wholly accommodating is 
shown by the rise in interest rates as the growth rate of reserves increases. Presumably he would 
say that a greater or lesser degree of accommodation could be shown by the frequency (and size) 
of the increases. The steeper the staircase, the less accommodating is the central bank.  
  Maybe we can improve on this. Firstly, given the DR line, it is not clear why there should 
be any variation in the rate at which new reserves are required at a given rate of interest. This is 
because the demand for additional reserves originates with the demand for new loans and this is 
determined through the mark-up by the rate of interest set by the central bank. This is most easily 
seen if we go back to fig. 1. A rise in the official rate raises the loan rate and reduces the demand 
for net new loans. Given L=D and the DR line, the demand for additional reserves is pre-
determined. If the official rate rises, we can read off a new demand for additional reserves and 
vice versa if the official rate is reduced. In other words, what we have in the upper-left quadrant 
is a downward-sloping demand curve for reserves. Now, given that in practice the only 
instrument available to a central bank is the rate of interest, it is not entirely clear how an excess 
































This does not mean that the demand for reserves cannot shift. Recall that we earlier said 
that rotations of the DR line can be used to show changes in banks’ liquidity preference or their 
degree of risk aversion. In fig. 4 we have taken just the left-hand quadrants of the diagram.  Fig. 
4a shows how a demand curve for reserves can be derived from the growth rate of deposits 
(generated by new loans and determined by the rate of interest). Fig. 4b re-draws the demand 
curve to show the effect of a desire to be more liquid for a given level of loan/deposit activity. A 
rotation of the DR line illustrates a change in the desire for additional reserves at a given rate of 
interest.  In fig. 4b the demand has increased. Suppose that the central bank has set the official 
rate at r0. Originally, this produced a flow of new loans such that banks required reserves to grow 
at R0. With the increased desire for liquidity, however, that growth rate has now risen to R1. In a 
sense therefore, we have a situation in which banks are potentially ‘short’ of reserves. But there is 
no question that the central bank will not accommodate the immediate ‘shortage’. It may do so at 
the going rate of interest or it may accommodate while resolving to rein in the growth by raising 
rates at the next MPC/FOMC meeting, or it might raise rates immediately. But there is no 
question about accommodation being forthcoming in the short-run.  
But this need not rule out the more interesting part of the structuralist contribution, which 
is that banks innovate so as to economise on reserves and this further reduces the central bank’s 
leverage over the money supply. Clearly they do. Encouraging clients to hold time instead of 
sight deposits, developing a market for CDs (so as to offer time deposits with sight deposit 
liquidity) are innovations which both lead to a reduced need to hold reserves. The development of 
an interbank market in which large quantities of funds can be borrowed on demand reduces the 
danger of a reserve shortage and enables individual banks to operate with lower reserves. Such 
developments rotate the DR line anti-clockwise and shift the demand curve for reserves 
progressively towards the origin. But, as we said earlier, this takes time and while it is happening 
















































Towards the end of section 2, we said that the accommodationist/structuralist debate was not 
well-served by attempts to present the issue as one of the slope of a money (or credit) supply 
curve in interest-money space. We can now say that it cannot be captured by the slope of a bank 
reserve supply curve.
12 
  Fig. 5 is a re-drawing of Fontana’s diagram (Fig. 1) to incorporate this modification to the 
top-left quadrant. It shows (much as before) an interest rate set by the central bank at r0, which, 
with a mark-up m, gives a loan rate of rL. Subject to credit-worthiness, banks meet the (flow) 
demand for net new loans arising at that rate of interest. Here the flow of new loans is L0 and this 
gives a flow of (willingly-held) new deposits of D0. Under present, but variable, institutional 
arrangements, this requires an expansion of reserves at the rate shown by R0 which the central 
bank accommodates. Changes in a wide range of bank and non-bank behaviour can be 
incorporated. For example, the mark up is variable, the L
D curve can shift, and the LD and DR 
lines can rotate causing a shift in the R
D curve. 
 
4. Macroeconomics without the LM curve 
From a monetary point of view the weaknesses of the IS/LM model are well-known. 
  
•  The money supply is fixed exogenously by the central bank 
•  The policy instrument is the money stock  
•  In the absence of policy intervention the money supply is fixed 
•  Policy interventions are transmitted to the real economy through real balance effects  
 
                                                 
12 Indeed, it maybe that the whole debate needs revisiting. It is difficult to see why the two positions should be so 
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All of these are so patently misleading as to make IS/LM a thoroughly unsuitable pedagogic 
device for students who are alert to what actually happens as widely reported by the media. 
Furthermore, things get worse when IS/LM is combined with an AD/AS framework which 
links aggregate demand to output and the price level, when current debates in macroeconomics 
require a link between demand, output and the rate of inflation. 
In 2000, David Romer courageously suggested dispensing with the LM curve altogether.  
By way of alternative, he proposed an IS-MP-IA
13 model, central to which is the replacement of 
the LM curve with a rate of interest imposed by the central bank, represented by a horizontal line, 
designated appropriately the M(onetary) P(olicy) curve. Further developments allowed him to re-
introduce the IS curve and to derive an aggregate demand curve in output/inflation space.  
  Given that Romer was amongst the first to offer an alternative to the conventional 
IS/LM/AS model it seems churlish to criticise. And, indeed, there is little about the proposal that 
is objectionable – so much so that one might wonder why it has not been taken up more 
enthusiastically. 
14   Nonetheless, what is finding its way into textbooks (we shall see) is slightly 
different and is generally more explicit about the supply side. 
  From a strictly monetary angle, Romer’s model is less attractive than it might be since he  
finds it hard to make a clean break with the idea that central banks can control the quantity of 
money, presenting the use of an interest rate instrument as a choice.  In a section on ‘The 
Money Market’ Romer gives an explanation of how the central bank imposes its chosen rate 
‘…by injecting or draining high-powered money…’ (p.162). In so far as the focus is on high-
powered (rather than broader measures of) money, this is correct. But when it comes to 
explaining how operations on the monetary base influence ‘the’ real rate of interest which (we 
saw above) is the central bank’s policy instrument, we switch to changes in the quantity of 
broad money and real balance effects. A change in reserves causes a change in broad money 
and by ‘…the standard experiment of the central bank increasing the money supply when the 
money market is in equilibrium…the supply of real balances now exceeds the demand…’ 
(p.163). This description is a long way from the reality recognised by economists working 
with central banks which is that central banks set the rate of interest by adjusting the price at 
which they refinance past borrowings of reserves and banks then convert that cost of reserves 
to a market rate of interest (relevant to the IS curve, for example) by a variable mark up. It also 
understates the extent to which Woodford and other members of the ‘new consensus’ have 
moved in recognising the hegemony of the interest rate instrument:  
 
It is often supposed that the key to understanding the effects of monetary policy on inflation 
must always be the quantity theory of money... It may then be concluded that what matters 
about any monetary policy is the implied path of the money supply... From such a perspective, 
it might seem that a clearer understanding of the consequences of a central bank’s actions 
would be facilitated by an explicit focus on what evolution of the money supply the bank 
intends to bring about – that is by monetary targeting... The present study aims to show that the 
basic premise of such a criticism is incorrect. One of the primary goals ... of this book is the 
development of a theoretical framework in which the consequences of alternative interest-rate 
rules can be analyzed, which does not require that they first be translated into equivalent rules 
for the evolution of the money supply’. (Woodford, 2003, p.48. Second emphasis added). 
 
  Since Romer, Bofinger, Mayer and Wollmerhäuser (BMW) (2006) have developed a 
more comprehensive framework ‘for teaching monetary economics’ – more comprehensive in the 
sense that it is more explicit about the supply side and introduces monetary policy rules (e.g. after 
Taylor), and central bank credibility. More interesting in many ways are the attempts to ‘apply’ 
these models, in the sense of incorporating them into mainstream macro teaching. As we’ve noted 
                                                 
13 Standing for I=S/Monetary Policy/Inflation Adjustment 
14 See note 4 above.   12
already, there are precious few such but Taylor (2001) and, most recently, Carlin and Soskice 
(2006) are notable examples.  
The C-S book is doubly interesting since it represents one of the first attempts to 
introduce a more realistic treatment of money into a mainstream textbook and also because it 
starts from a position which embraces more wholeheartedly the essence of the new consensus. 
There is no reference to central banks controlling stocks of narrow (or broad) money with a view 
to targeting interest rates. In this sense the ‘rejection’ of the LM curve is more complete than it is 
in the Romer approach. In Carlin and Soskice, the interest rate is set as part of a Taylor-type rule, 
and in so far as a mechanism for setting such a rate is required it is consistent with Woodford 
(2003).  
The basic model in Carlin and Soskice is developed over pages 81-87.  It consists of three 
equations and is described as the IS-PC-MR model. As with Romer (and BMW), the IS curve 
remains but Romer’s ‘inflation adjustment’ is replaced by an ‘inertia-augmented Phillips curve’ 
and ‘monetary policy’ is modelled more explicitly as a ‘monetary rule’. (Notice that it is a 
monetary policy rule and not an interest rate rule). 
The starting point is figure 7 in which the central bank is assumed to have an inflation 
target of 2 per cent. Initially, the economy is in equilibrium at A, with inflation running at that 
level. Output is at its ‘natural’ level (on a long-run vertical Phillips curve) so there is no output 
gap to put positive (or negative) pressure on inflation. An inflation shock is introduced which 
moves the economy to B at which inflation is 6 per cent. In order to return to target, the central 
bank raises the real interest rate
15 and pushes output below its natural level and we move down 
the short-run Phillips curve (drawn for π
l = 6) to the point labelled F. Notice that F is selected 
because the central bank is at a point tangential to the best available indifference curve at that 
combination of output and inflation. The indifference curve represents the output/inflation trade-
off (the degree of inflation aversion) for that particular central bank. (A more inflation averse 
central bank would have a different indifference map and would move the economy to a point on 
PC (π
l = 6) to the left of F).
16 As the inflation rate falls to 5 per cent, the short-run PC shifts down 
to (π
l = 5). The central bank can then lower the real interest rate, allowing output to rise, so the 
economy moves to F’ and by this process the central bank steers the economy back to 

















                                                 
15 Carlin and Soskice (p.84) make the same point as Romer, that the central bank strictly speaking sets the nominal 
interest rate but does so with a view to achieving a real interest rate. 
16 The indifference curves in figure 7 are segments of a series of concentric rings centred on A. If the central bank’s 
loss function gives equal weight to inflation and output, the rings will be perfect circles. If the central bank puts more 
weight on inflation, the rings will be ellipsoid (stretched) in the horizontal plane. Hence greater inflation version 
creates a tangent ‘further down’ the PC. 
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The next step is to introduce the IS curve and the real rate of interest. This is done in the 
upper part of figure 8. To begin with the economy is in equilibrium, shown in both panels by the 
point A. Notice that in the upper panel, this includes a real rate of interest identified as rs  (a 
‘stabilising’ rate of interest which maintains a zero output gap).  In the lower part, we then have 
an approximate replay of figure 7. There is an inflation shock which takes the economy from 
equilibrium at A to a rate of inflation of 4 per cent (at B). In figure 9a, the central bank now raises 
the real rate of interest (to r’) which has the effect of moving us up the IS curve to C at which the 
level of output is reduced. (In the lower panel we move down the PC π
l = 4). As the rate of 
inflation subsides to 3 per cent, the real rate is reduced allowing some expansion of output. We 
are now on PC (π
l = 3) but since we are still to the left of Y* inflation continues to fall. This 
allows a further reduction in the real interest rate when inflation comes back to target at 2 per 
cent. 
  Clearly, there are substantial similarities with Romer. The dynamics are essentially the 
same, for example. There is an implicit aggregate demand curve, with inflation on the vertical 
axis, which is made downward-sloping by virtue of the central bank’s reaction to inflation. But in 
Carlin and Soskice they are spelt out in more detail and the reaction function of the central bank 
(here the ‘monetary rule’) is clearer. The big difference comes, however, when we look at later 
pages where Carlin and Soskice discuss ‘How the MR relates to the LM curve’ (pp.92-3). The 
first point they make is that the choice of model (MR or LM) must depend upon the nature of the 
nature of the monetary regime. ‘If the central bank is using an interest-rate based monetary rule 
...the correct model is the 3-equation model with the MR. This is often called an inflation-
targeting regime’ (p.92). Of course, they recognise that there is at any time a stock of monetary 
assets in existence and that these must be held by the non-bank private sector (since that is how 
money is defined). In that sense there is a permanent equilibrium between the demand for money 
and its supply. In an inflation targeting model one can imagine an LM curve if one so chooses: 
‘...it goes through the intersection of the IS curve and the interest rate set by the central bank but 
it plays no role in fixing the position of the economy in terms of output, inflation or the interest 
rate’ (p.93. Emphasis added). In a footnote they add ‘...in a world in which the central bank sets 
the interest rate, the causality goes from i→L→M→H whereas in the traditional LM model the 
causality is reversed from: H→M→i, where H is high powered money’.  If only the ‘L’ were the 
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5. Bringing the pieces together 
 
In figure 8, from C-S, we have a model which incorporates many of the features of a mainstream 
macromodel wherein the Phillips curve is vertical in the long-run but monetary policy can cause 
deviations from the equilibrium level of output for as long as it takes for price setting to catch up 
with the current rate of inflation. Furthermore, it incorporates much of the emerging consensus 
about modern monetary regimes and the way in which monetary policy is conducted. For 
example, the central bank sets interest rates and the money supply is endogenously determined. 
The rate of interest for this purpose is whatever rate is relevant to the central bank’s refinancing 
of bank reserves (a very short-term repo rate in most regimes) and while it is only the nominal 
rate that the central bank can control directly this rate is set and revised at short intervals in order 
to produce the real rate required to adjust or maintain the rate of inflation. Naturally, many post-
Keynesians would take issue with the idea that policy affects real variables only in the short-run. 
But it would not be difficult to modify the model to allow potential output to respond positively 
to high levels of actual output in the spirit of Arestis and Sawyer (2005). Our point in this paper is 
that we should at least recognise that ‘mainstream’ economics has woken up to and is trying to 
present the monetary side of the economy with reference to reality. There should be some scope 
at least for pleasure on earth when sinners repent. 
  In figure 5 (adapted from Fontana, 2006) we have a model which incorporates not just the 
basic ideas of endogenous money, but one which can be used also to debate some of the finer 
points of post Keynesian debate. The question for this section is whether we can bring the two 
together in any satisfactory way. The common, and central, feature of both is that the policy 
instrument is the rate of interest and money is endogenously determined. This features in the IS-
MR-PC model in the upper panel where it determines the position of the economy on the IS 
curve. It features in the Fontana model as the repo rate and (when a mark-up is added) as the loan 
rate. There are, of course, hundreds of interest rates and we have warned (in section 2) against 
treating them as all equivalent or even as a fixed set of relationships. Nonetheless, models must 
simplify and it seems reasonable to suggest that Fontana’s bank loan rate can be interpreted as the 
relevant rate of interest in an IS diagram. After all, for some firms at certain times, the bank loan 
rate will be the rate at which they finance investment; at others, where maybe they are using bond 
finance, the movements in bond and loan rates should be similar. Furthermore, in Fontana the L
D 
curve is drawn for a given rate of inflation. The flow of net new loans is positive partly because 
of the upward trend in the price level. If this trend increases, then the L
D curve shifts. For a given 
curve, therefore, we have a given rate of inflation and any change in r0/rL must be equivalent to a 
change in the real rate. There seems no obvious reason, therefore, why we should not treat the 
rate of interest in both models as a real rate and regard the loan rate and the rate in the IS diagram 
as equivalent. 
Taking the same approach that we followed in figure 8, we can see that the interactions 
between the two models produces perfectly sensible outcomes. We begin in the Phillips curve 
and IS diagrams in equilibrium at A. Output is at its natural level because the central bank has set 
the nominal rate at r0 which translates into the appropriate real rate. Inflation is on target at 2 per 
A  15
cent. Given this rate of interest and the state of the economy, the demand for new loans is 
creating new deposits at the rate D0 as shown in the Fontana diagram. Now, as before, we 
introduce an inflation shock shown in the Phillips curve diagram as a shift in the short-run curve 
to PC (π
l = 4). To bring inflation back to its target, the central bank increases the repo rate (r0 to 
r0’)  so as to raise the real rate of interest charged on loans (rL to rL’) which pushes the economy 
down PC (π






















That same rate of interest, when translated to the monetary side of the model, produces a 
reduction in the flow rate of new loans and deposits as shown by the dotted (as opposed to 
dashed) lines. We conclude from this that our post Keynesian representation of the monetary 
sector is able to produce a ‘sensible’ reaction to a macroeconomic shock.   
For good measure, we now run the test the other way round, in order to see whether a 
‘post-Keynesian’ shock originating in the monetary sector can be sensibly represented in both 
parts of the model. Starting from equilibrium we take the case mentioned in section 3 whereby 
there is an increase in banks’ liquidity preference. This involves an increase in banks’ mark-up 
over the official rate and an increase demand for reserves relative to deposits. Figure 10 refers.  
We beginin QI where banks increase their mark up. With the repo rate unchanged at r0, 
the lending rate rises from rL to rL
’. In quadrant V, this pushed us up the IS curve and in quadrant 
VI we move down PC (π
l = 2). Output and inflation are now below target (at Y’/π=1%). In the 
monetary sector, QI and QII show a slower growth of credi and money (L1/D1). In QIV this 
would normally mean a slower growth in required reserves. However, banks’ liquidity preference 
has increased so we shall assume that the demand continues to expand at its original rate, in spite 
of the slower expansion of loans and deposits. Consequently DR has rotated to DR’ (QIII). 
Back in the goods market (QVI) the PC will shift to PC (π
l = 1) as inflation inertia is 
overcome. If the situation persists there will be repeated downward shifts of the PC. However, 
the situation can be stabilised at Y*/1% if the central bank reduces the repo rate so as to bring rL
’ 
back to rL. The economy will be restored to its original position on the IS curve but inflation 
will\be below target. To restore the original equilibrium at Y*/ 2%, the central bank will need to 
lower the repo rate further (rL
” < rL) in order to move the economy temporarily above Y*. This  
 
































































takes us to A on PC (π
l = 1). For reasons of clarity this is shown by the large arrow in QV; for the 
same reasons, the required movements in the repo and loan rates in QIV/QVI have to be 
imagined. As the PC moves back to PC (π
l = 2), the central bank raises the repo rate to bring rL” 
up to the original loan rate, rL. (The small arrow in QV). Notice that this new equilibrium is 
associated with the repo rate (at r
’)  below its original level since market rates now enjoy a larger 
mark-up. Credit and money growth are returned to their original level (L0/D0), as the original 
growth of nominal GDP is restored in the goods market. However, these new conditions are 
associated with a more rapid expansion of reserves to meet banks’ extra demands for liquidity. 





In the last few years there has been a long overdue recognition in mainstream macroeconomics 
that persisting with the fiction of a fixed money supply under the discretionary control of the 
central bank has to be abandoned. Attempts to incorporate this into the teaching environment, 
however, have been painfully slow. Furthermore, the current suggestions overlook entirely a 
large amount of work that has been done in post-Keynesian economics over more than thirty 
years to develop a realistic and detailed analysis of the monetary sector. 
  Consequently, there is a danger that the efforts of post-Keynesian scholars will get much 
less than their just desserts for the spread of a more enlightened and informed macroeconomics. 
In this paper we have shown just one way in which much that is familiar in post-Keynesian 
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